Showing posts with label Carl von Clausewitz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Carl von Clausewitz. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

There but for the grace of God go I....

Come on mothers throughout the land,
Pack your boys off to Vietnam.
Come on fathers, and don't hesitate
To send your sons off before it's too late.
And you can be the first ones in your block
To have your boy come home in a box. 

Country Joe And The Fish, wrote that and made the Vietnam Song famous during Woodstock.  Gimme and "F"...Gimme a "U"...

I thought about that song when I started writing these posts on if our effort was worth the cost.  Was the condemnation of  Kitt, Cronkite, Kennedy, King, the hippies justified?  Were they the one's who "lost" the war for us, or, like I believe now, the war was never ours to win since South Vietnam had nothing to offer its people other than being not-communists, which for a peasant, means very little.

I want to go back to Carl von Clausewitz understanding of war:
[T]he use of power involves two factors. The first is the strength of available means, which may be measured somewhat by numbers (although not entirely). The second factor is the strength of the will which can not be specifically measured (only estimated) as it is intangible.  Once a state has gained an approximation of the enemy's strength of resistance it can review its own means and adjust them upwards accordingly in an effort to gain the advantage. As the enemy will also be doing this, it too becomes reciprocal. [third reciprocal action] (1)
We had the strength, no doubt about that.  But in Vietnam, it really did not matter how strong our military was, without the other factor needed to meet our objectives - a stable south Vietnam government - all our military could do is keep the bad guys at bay, which Tet showed in 1968, was not going to be easy.

Now that we knew, and by "we" I mean the people of the US, Carl von Clausewitz's second factor kicks in:
The second factor is the strength of the will which can not be specifically measured (only estimated) as it is intangible.  Once a state has gained an approximation of the enemy's strength of resistance it can review its own means and adjust them upwards accordingly in an effort to gain the advantage.
Walter Cronkite and Robert Kennedy saw what it was going to take, and understood how difficult, or most likely saw it as impossible, for the United States to "win" this conflict.  Which is why Robert Kennedy said in his February 1968 speech:
For years we have been told that the measure of our success and progress in Vietnam was
increasing security and control for the population. Now we have seen that none of the population
is secure and no area is under sure control.
Four years ago when we only had about 30,000 troops in Vietnam, the Vietcong were unable to mount the assaults on cities they have now conducted against our enormous forces. At one time a suggestion that we protect enclaves was derided. Now there are no protected enclaves. 
This has not happened because our men are not brave or effective, because they are. It is because we have misconceived the nature of the war: It is because we have sought to resolve by military might a conflict whose issue depends upon the will and conviction of the South Vietnamese people. It is like sending a lion to halt an epidemic of jungle rot. (2)
I think that was a reasonable and fair analogy.  It is also an accurate understanding of what was happening in Vietnam.  So if we can't "win" with our military alone, how much "means" should we put into it as we "adjust upwards accordingly?"

This is where it hits close to home for me.  I could have been the "means" had we continued.  Without fully understanding my reasoning for taking exception to General Patrick Brady's San Antonio Express News article, I understood when I read it that he was incorrect in his premise:
[O]ur defeat came from the elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard.
General Brady is an absolutist (in addition to being delusional).  Had we pressed on; "Unbelievably, there was no military follow-up." would that have changed anything?  I can't say, but neither can he.  But the fact still remains that we could not achieve our objectives with the military alone.  Unless you don't want to believe the CIA's analysis in May, 1968:
"The situation thereafter will largely depend, as it has in the past, on the question of the will to persist of either side rather than on the attainment of an overwhelming military victory."
General Brady, as an absolutist, thinks the lion can cure jungle rot.  Walter Cronkite and Robert Kennedy, as realists, understand that the lion cannot.

General Brady is one of "those who said that we could win and must" and Cronkite, Kennedy, Kitt, and "the elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard (3)" are "those who said that even if we could win we should not and that the military considerations were a complete obfuscation of the basic issues." (4 page 2)

General Brady is free to express his reasons as to why he thinks we could win and should have continued on, something he has not done other than denigrate those who share the other view and make up stories in an effort to right a wrong that is there but not there to the degree he thinks it is.  How he feels about what took place is uniquely his own, and. like for me, his objectivity can be compromised by factors that fall close to home.

Without a crystal ball there is no way to determine what course taken - or not taken - would have resulted in a better outcome.  What we do know for sure is that the enemy had the capability of making us work for that victory.  That's where Carl von Clausewitz's "it can review its own means and adjust them upwards accordingly in an effort to gain the advantage" comes in.  Evaluate and re-evaluate.  Left to General Brady, Kid Rock, Hawks, and absolutists, the means is "whatever it takes."

In 1968 I was 11 years old.  When I was 12, Country Joe was telling me what could await me.  When I was 16, Richard Nixon finally put an end to "whatever it takes."

There but for the grace of God go I.


Next Post: My Country Right or Wrong

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Thursday, July 7, 2011

Kid Rock, Carl von Clausewitz, O'Brien, and General Loan

I read an old copy of Maxim my son had.  It had an interview with Kid Rock, dated 10/8/2007, in which he is asked the question: How would you run the war differently?  Here is his response:
I’d kick the media out. War’s not pretty, and you can’t fight a war diplomatically. We didn’t win the Revolutionary War like that. We were the original terrorists, ducking behind buildings and crap. As harsh as this sounds—and I’m sure I’ll get crap for it—if somebody kills an American soldier in a certain section of town, I’d blow up that section of town. I’d do what the Israelis do and take out 50 motherfuckers. I’d say, "Next American who gets killed, 50 more innocent people. Start giving up insurgents or we’ll wipe out your fucking block." You gotta fight fire with fire.
Would you not conclude that Kid Rock is an ardent believer in Carl von Clausewitz's first reciprocal action:
"Therefore, war in its most natural manner would involve each state continually reciprocating each other's use of force (plus some) to maintain a superiority, until both were using violence to its utmost extent."
Could one reasonably infer that Kid Rock believes that war allows a nation to "fight to war's natural extremes," that is, to perpetuate acts of violence without compromise" and "without political and moral moderation." (1)

And, if that is true, if confronted with a hypothetical, he would have to answer in a similar manner as he did when he stated " "Next American who gets killed, 50 more innocent people. Start giving up insurgents or we’ll wipe out your fucking block."

Since he has already stated unequivocally that it is quite acceptable to kill 50 more innocent people, had he been asked, like Winston was in 1984, he would quite eagerly respond exactly the same way, would he not?
O'Brien: In general terms, what are you prepared to do?'   
Kid Rock: Anything that we are capable of.
O'Brien: You are prepared to give your lives?
Kid Rock: Yes.
O'Brien: You are prepared to commit murder?
Kid Rock: Yes.
O'Brien: To commit acts of sabotage which may cause the death of hundreds of innocent people?
Kid Rock: Yes.
O'Brien: If, for example, it would somehow serve our interests to throw sulphuric acid in a child's face -- are you prepared to do that?
Kid Rock:    Yes.
So if Kid Rock, who has never been to war, who has never been in a battle, who has never had to decide who must suffer, or witness the pain and agony of the aftermath, finds it so fucking easy to condemn 50 innocent people to death for the actions perpetuated by others, doesn't it seem plausible that General Loan's actions on February 1st, 1968 could have been the result of seeing the situation through that same prism?

If Kid Rock can find it reasonable to kill 50 innocents because one of our soldiers was killed, isn't it also reasonable that General Loan could execute an enemy soldier who had just invaded his city?  I mean look at it objectively.  Our soldiers are basically an invading force in another country.  Some of the people who live there don't want us there in THEIR country.  They have every right in the world to try and kill us.  General Loan, on the other hand, was in HIS city which had just been invaded by others who were trying to force their will on him.

Now, look at the definition of moral turpitude:
Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience. 
When looking at what Kid Rock would do and what General Loan did do, which one meets the definition more succinctly?

Now you may be thinking that Kid Rock was just being boastful, that he would never do that.  I say he would, not directly, but indirectly.  Most likely he would pussy out when it came time to pouring the sulfuric acid onto the child, or shooting 50 old ladies and children in the marketplace.  That's what most of these "fight fire with fire" types become when the situation calls for action; pussies.

Instead he would turn a blind eye to what was happening, play nudge-nudge with those that would carry it out, and hide under his flag poncho as others did his dirty work in furtherance of Carl von Clausewitz' first reciprocal action.  He would find a General Loan and unleash him under the rhetoric that "War’s not pretty, and you can’t fight a war diplomatically."

This is one side of the coin.  Like it or not, this is an absolute theology as distasteful and real as that of an absolute war.  On the other side of that coin, however, is something different.  Not, as one would think, the complete opposite to what is absolute.  No, this side of the coin is a bit more nuanced, a bit more reasonable, a bit more humane.

Look once again at what Robert Kennedy said on February 8th, 1968:
Nor does it serve the interests of America to fight this war as if moral standards could be subordinated to immediate necessities. Last week, a Vietcong suspect was turned over to the chief of the Vietnamese Security Services, who executed him on the spot—a flat violation of the Geneva Convention on the Rules of War. 
The photograph of the execution was on front pages all around the world—leading our best and oldest friends to ask, more in sorrow than in anger, what has happened to America? 
Somehow, as I have gotten to know and understand General Loan, I can see him being asked the same questions by O'Brien, but when it came to pouring sulfuric acid on a child, I really think General Loan would have told him 'no'.

But I could not see Kid Rock, Dick Cheney, or John Yoo having moral standards high enough to where they could not be "subordinated to immediate necessities."  These three, and others like them, view the world and our nation's behavior regarding our wants and needs, as absolute.

What does this say about some of my fellow countrymen who wield a great deal of power and influence over my fellow citizens?  What does this say about those who would denigrate Robert Kennedy for questioning what we are doing, why we are doing it, and the cost of said actions?   What type of behavior should we all see as corrupt or depraved, as a degenerate act or practice, regardless of why it is being performed?

Which side of the coin do we want America to land on, Kid Rock or Robert Kennedy?


Next Post: The "Good Guys" Government: Equally important as the military effort in winning the war

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Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Carl von Clausewitz, the CIA, and General Loan

Like I said in the beginning of this series of posts; there is a lot I don't know about the Vietnam war, a lot I should have known at the time, a lot the public should have known, and especially my parents who, for them, I would have done my duty as asked of me by my country, should have known as a means of helping me decide what I might have gotten myself into.  I turned 18 in 1975, so I missed all the fun by just a couple years.

Carl von Clausewitz, the guy who wrote the book "On War," talks about the concept of "Absolute War" explained as follows:
"[A]bsolute war is a philosophical abstraction--a "logical fantasy"--that is impossible in practice because it is not directed or constrained by political motives or concerns, nor limited by the practical constraints of time or space. He called warfare constrained by these moderating real-world influences real war."
When you read all the comments regarding the Eddie Adams photo (example), you start to understand that most people see a situation in the most abstract, and fail to connect all the different parts in play.  What they cannot grasp is how things that run the gambit from ego, to pride, to faith, to superstition, to history, to culture, to logistics - all the way down the basic laws of physics - mold, shape, and confine a war.  All of these things, plus more, interconnect and places constraints on our ability to perform, as it did with Vietnam.

Such is the truth about what took place during the Vietnam war as well as what General Loan did that day on February 1st, 1968.  The outcome - the reality - was the result of all sorts of things in play before and during.  Anything else brought into the conversation about the how and why that is not factual or interconnected is a logical fantasy perpetuated by those that cannot accept the truth as it really is.

"He was one of us," Eddie Adams said.  We were there for for him and he for us. Simple!  And that's why it's a logical fantasy to think of it in such an absolute way.  We must have been there for a reason, if General Loan was one of us.  That assumes that there must have been a "them" in order for there to be an "us."  The "them" was the communist north.  If  you can remember the time before the Berlin wall fell, the Soviet Union disintegrated, and China became capitalists, communism was a big scary boogieman for the US.  You cannot look at it with 21st century eyes, you need to see it with eyes that viewed the world in the 50's and 60's.

Fighting communism was the main political motive that directed our involvement over there.  That's what gave us an enemy...a "them."  Now let's look at that enemy from a grounding in truth (assuming that declassified CIA documents are truthful).  What did we know about our enemy eight months before Tet?

From: The Vietnam Situation: The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate - May 23, 1967, Central Intelligence Agency Collection.
"The situation thereafter will largely depend, as it has in the past, on the question of the will to persist of  either side rather than on the attainment of an overwhelming military victory."
That was the conclusion, derived from this:
"Although the enemy hopes to overrun a number of allied field positions, his principal aim is to inflict maximum attrition on our forces at whatever cost to his own, and to check the momentum of the pacification effort."
Here is what Walter Cronkite would say on February 27, 1968, for which he took a lot of flak and was accused of losing the war for us by turning public opinion away from one of support.
"To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion."
What does Carl von Clausewitz had to say about war:
"Therefore, war in its most natural manner would involve each state continually reciprocating each other's use of force (plus some) to maintain a superiority, until both were using violence to its utmost extent." [first reciprocal action]
And in 1967, what did the US understand the situation in Vietnam to be?

The Vietnam Situation: An Analysis and Estimate
And what does Carl von Clausewitz have to say about this type of knowledge that was known to the CIA?:
[T]he use of power involves two factors. The first is the strength of available means, which may be measured somewhat by numbers (although not entirely). The second factor is the strength of the will which can not be specifically measured (only estimated) as it is intangible.  Once a state has gained an approximation of the enemy's strength of resistance it can review its own means and adjust them upwards accordingly in an effort to gain the advantage. As the enemy will also be doing this, it too becomes reciprocal. [third reciprocal action]
Why all this lecture on the theory of war?  How does this relate to General Loan?  Lets look at this particular sentence from the Wikipedia page on "Absolute War."
Absolute war can be seen to be an act of violence without compromise, in which states fight to war's natural extremes; it is a war without the 'grafted' political and moral moderations.
What does an act of violence without compromise entail?  Is it collateral damage?  Is it torture?  Is it killing woman and children in  My Lai?  Raping women in Nanking? Or was it executing a bound man who was part of an invasion force into your city?  In other words, what does an act of violence without compromise allow?  Surely it cannot allow for everything, or do we allow it to because it is war?

War brings forward certain truths, like it or not.  War will always move towards more and more extreme actions.  War will always require two factors; strength of available means and the strength of the will behind the effort.  If we can assume this premise to be true, what General Loan did that day on February 1st 1968 was simply an absolute.  Without any other considerations taken into account, what he did was no more or less extreme than any other act committed that day, if the premise is true that war is an act of violence without compromise. 

Then why is he singled out?  Quite simply, it is because we cannot accept the Carl von Clausewitz premise and call ourselves human, compassionate, or Christian.  What we saw in the photo and the film was the reality in play when one group wants to make another group comply with its will.  That's what war is all about.  What the US, General Loan, and Nguyen Van Lem were doing that day was fulfilling war's ultimate purpose: trying to force the other into a position from which it cannot resist the other's will.

This does not justify - nor condemn - General Loan's actions that day.  It only helps explain it.  And for those who believe that the photo and Walter Cronkite lost the war because it changed public opinion, that places blame for our lack of a "victory" on those who did not accept the cost in blood and treasure for the purpose of forcing the opposing group to accept our will.

And if Carl von Clausewitz and the CIA in May of 1967 were correct, the extreme that this conflict was going to let lose was going to be bloody, long, and severe, a point Walter Cronkite made succinctly in 1968 after Tet:
For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. This summer's almost certain standoff will either end in real give-and-take negotiations or terrible escalation; and for every means we have to escalate, the enemy can match us, and that applies to invasion of the North, the use of nuclear weapons, or the mere commitment of one hundred, or two hundred, or three hundred thousand more American troops to the battle. And with each escalation, the world comes closer to the brink of cosmic disaster.
It would take five more years and 58.209 US deaths for our strength of will to stop reciprocating and put an end to the war's natural extremes. Had we continued, had we deemed this effort to continue whatever the costs, what might those extremes be?  Anything and everything, including nuclear weapons and countless more deaths, hence Cronkite's logical conclusion - which is sound based on Carl von Clausewitz's first reciprocal action: "...each state continually reciprocating each other's use of force (plus some) to maintain a superiority, until both were using violence to its utmost extent."

What General Loan showed us February 1st, 1968 was the ugly face of what war is really all about.

Next post: Why the lies, misstatements, half-truths, and downright disgust....


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