Vietnam - CIA And The Generals

I am working on a book, my first (second if you count an unpublished novel), dealing with General Nguyen Ngoc Loan (pronounced "low-ahn"), the guy who was both filmed and photographed shooting the prisoner during Tet Offensive of 1968.

I find the story fascinating, especially the manipulation of the events and the man (Loan) in order to rectify a particular point of view.  In the bigger picture of this one famous event, is the whole situation of Vietnam from 1966 to 1975.

As part of my research, I have tried to read as much information on General Loan and Tet as I can get my hands on.  One of the sources of information that has come available are secret document from the CIA and the Administration that are now available online.  I recently went to the Johnson Library at UT-Austin and got myself a research pass to look at the documents there.  I am going to look at Eddie Adam's journal from 1968 next time I am in town.  The Adam's collection is also held at UT-Austin.

I just finished reading a declassified CIA book called "CIA and the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam."

Source: FOIA-CIA

This, in my opinion, along with the Powell Doctrine should be "must" reading for anyone given the power to commit their nation's blood and treasure to further a goal.

Despite what General Brady (the guy who started me down this path of understanding Vietnam) may think, it was not because, as he puts it:

[o]ur defeat came from the elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard.

How a Two-Star General can be so clueless on what took place in Vietnam, the country and war he was fighting in, is a perfect example of why we "lost" in Vietnam.  In two words, it can be summed up as "The Generals."  More precisely, it can be described as the ineptitude of those in charge.  And by inept, I mean lacking in the the general suitability for the task at hand, the inability to learn and reason.  General Brady is a prime example of this, as were the Generals running South Vietnam in 67 - 75.  They may be good at military management where you bark and order and see it get performed, but they lack the ability to understand the dynamics in play when that authority has no bearing on the situation and wisdom and compromise are what is necessary.

One thing you glean from reading this book is that the US understood we were not going to "win" back in late 1967, before Tet, before Walter Cronkite, before John Kerry.  We held out hope, but it was doomed because of the ineptitude of the Generals that were the government offed in response to the Communists of the North.

Let me sum it up for you, using the CIA's take on this time and place:

[this book] traces the tortuous course of events in Saigon following the fall of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Ahern strikingly illustrates Saigon Station efforts to work with and understand the various military governments of South Vietnam which followed Diem, and carefully details CIA attempts to stabilize and urge democratization on the changing military regimes in order to save South Vietnam from Communism.

Read that section in red.  That was our problem, that was why we were doomed to fail or have it drag on and on and on.  Same thing with Afghanistan and Iraq.  Without a stable government that the people being governed can get behind, no amount of resolve, money, bodies, or non-defeatism will make a difference.

The US was there to "save" the South from Communism.  That goal was not of interest to the Vietnamese people:

[t]he essential point as Polgar [CIA Chief of Station (COS)] saw it was that Nguyen Cao Ky and then Nguyen Van Thieu had succeeded where their predecessors failed by establishing security and by offering the fundamentally apolitical peasant the prospect of improved living standards. (page 135)

Polgar's DCOS [Deputy Chief of Station], Conrad LaGueux, was less confident that the massive American investment in the rural economy had produced greater loyalty to the regime: in his retrospective opinion, "the VC had extensive popular support." (page 135)

That took place in 1973.  You see, while we were "saving" Vietnam, the people - the "apolitical peasants" were wanting Communism.  That was a reality and a dynamic in play starting early on in Vietnam.  It was in play in the early 60's, 67, 68, 73, and finally to its conclusion in 75.  We were saving people from something they could care less about in the first place.  We [US] feared Communism.  The Generals feared Communism because they would lose their livelihood.  But the people - the hearts and minds we needed to make this work - could care less.

"Care", in this case, was a result of their living conditions.  The Generals in charge of the South (the Government of Vietnam -GVN) were too inept to fully comprehend this, so the "sweat cancer" of corruption and self-gratification prevailed in the South.  The Communists offered something other than the Generals.  The Generals, themselves were fractured between northerners (Ky) and southerners (Thieu) and they were all at odds with the Buddhists who resented the Catholics who were put in charge of running the government by the French.  South Vietnam was a mess, and there we (US) were trying to make it into something it was not ready or willing to be.

But it was not for lack of trying.  55,000 dead Americans and hundreds of thousands of dead Vietnamese can attest to that effort.  Our defeat was not at the hands of the media or Berkeley professors, it was inept men who controlled the situation that lacked the wisdom and aptitude to fully comprehend the dynamics and reality in play.

But even at its best, it perpetuated the almost schizoid Agency (and US Government) approach to the political aspect of the conflict. The GVN had to be invigorated and reformed, and the peasantry must be won over to the government side. CIA did indeed recognize the need to 'develop peasant leadership, at least at the local level. But it never questioned the contradictory imperative that this be done without disturbing the social and economic structure bequeathed by the French colonial regime. (page 228)

We knew it was a task that relied too much on an oversimplification of human endeavor.  We feared Communism so we did what we thought would curtail it.  Threw money and bodies at it.  But Communism meant nothing to the Vietnamese other than it was non-French and non-US and non-military control.

We knew it was doomed before Tet of 68.  We knew but continued down a path deemed appropriate and sound by inept men we put in charge of such decisions.

So I'll close this post with this little bit of behind the scenes information (pages 135 & 136):

One of Polgar's officers in the Indications and Assessment Branch (lAB) remembered the working level as less sanguine even than LaGueux. Robert Vandaveer had run the Station's office in Hue for two years before he came to Saigon in mid-1973 to join IAB.

Explaining the reason for this assignment, Polgar told Vandaveer that the "social democratic" bias of the branch, staffed by DI (Directorate of Intelligence) officers, needed to be balanced by a DO (Directorate of Operations) presence;

Vandaveer took this to mean that Polgar wanted to see more commitment to the government cause and less agonizing about its weaknesses.

The COS did not prohibit reporting bad news, but he did impose strict standards of verification, and a requirement that such reporting be "put into perspective." In practice, this meant that reports of government corruption, individual instances of which were hard to confirm, were seldom disseminated. And when a village headquarters, for example, was lost to a Communist landgrabbing operation after the Paris agreement, the report had to specify the much greater number of villages remaining under Saigon's control.  

The requirement for "perspective" did not apply to good news, and Vandaveer thought that when retired Major General Timmes made his periodic tours to debrief his ARVN contacts on the Station's behalf, Polgar accepted his usually upbeat reporting at face value.

As Vandaveer saw it, the divergent views of management and the working level reflected a Mission-wide phenomenon, with the Mission Council clinging to an optimistic, "get with the program" mentality that echoed the style of the now-departed US combat forces. Station analysts, on the other hand, looked at the reporting of Hanoi's infiltration of men and supplies in a "mood of foreboding," and many street case officers were entirely cynical about the integrity of the South Vietnamese political process.

That's not coming from General Brady's "dishonest media" that's what the CIA has described about the attitude of those in charge of "winning."

"Get with the program" is always shorthand for ignore the reality and accept an inept leader's magical thinking.


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Wars kill people. That is what makes them different from all other forms of human enterprise.

[Written last year]

You know where that title came from?  Colin Powell.  That's from his paper: U.S. Forces Challenges Ahead, 1992 in Foreign Affairs;  Vol. 71 Issue 5, p32-45, 14p.  What's in that paper is also referred to as the "Powell Doctrine."

You know what else he said in that paper:

We owe it to the men and women who go in harm's way to make sure that this is always the case and that their lives are not squandered for unclear purposes.

Look what John Kerry said in 1971:

...In our opinion, and from our experience, there is nothing in South Vietnam, nothing which could happen that realistically threatens the United States of America. And to attempt to justify the loss of one American life in Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos by linking such loss to the preservation of freedom, which those misfits supposedly abuse, is to us the height of criminal hypocrisy, and it is that kind of hypocrisy which we feel has torn this country apart....

Look at what Robert Kennedy said in 1968:

This has not happened because our men are not brave or effective, because they are. It is because we have misconceived the nature of the war: It is because we have sought to resolve by military might a conflict whose issue depends upon the will and conviction of the South Vietnamese people. It is like sending a lion to halt an epidemic of jungle rot.

Why would we use the term "squandered" if that were not a possibility for the men and woman who are asked to serve?  Obviously Powell was speaking from some historical grounding.  If we are the greatest country in the world, surely we would never "squander" these lives.  Correct?

Look at what else Powell says:

When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives.

Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if they are not always possible. We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation--more bombs, more men and women, more force.

History has not been kind to this approach to war-making. In fact this approach has been tragic--both for the men and women who are called upon to implement it and for the nation. This is not to argue that the use of force is restricted to only those occasions where the victory of American arms will be resounding, swift and overwhelming. It is simply to argue that the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue. 

See that?  "A new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation--more bombs, more men and women, more force."  Golly jeepers, doesn't that sound just like Vietnam?  And what about those absolutists who think we could have won if we dropped more bombs, kicked the press out, sent more troops, and used every tool and resource we had against the enemy.  Had we just had the will....

Here is what Powell says about war:

All wars are limited. As Carl von Clausewitz was careful to point out, there has never been a state of absolute war. Such a state would mean total annihilation. The Athenians at Melos, Attila the Hun, Tamerlane, the Romans salting the fields of the Carthaginians may have come close, but even their incredible ruthlessness gave way to pragmatism before a state of absolute war was achieved`

The Gulf War was a limited-objective war. If it had not been, we would be ruling Baghdad today--at unpardonable expense in terms of money, lives lost and ruined regional relationships. The Gulf War was also a limited-means war--we did not use every means at our disposal to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. But we did use over-whelming force quickly and decisively. This, I believe, is why some have characterized that war as an "all-out" war. It was strictly speaking no such thing.

Vietnam was not addressed in a similar manner as was the Gulf War.  For that matter, neither was invading Iraq and Afghanistan at the turn of this century.  Without clear objectives military might means very little in obtaining an end point.  Had the US body count been more, we would have demanded we get out of those two places in a similar manner as Vietnam, I suspect.  As I write this, we are still in Afghanistan.

What Kennedy and Kerry understood was what Powell would come to articulate in 1992.  

Kennedy said:

The fifth illusion is that this war can be settled in our own way and in our own time on our own terms. Such a settlement is the privilege of the triumphant: of those who crush their enemies in battle or wear away their will to fight. 

Kerry said:

Therefore, I think it is ridiculous to assume we have to play this power game based on total warfare. I think there will be guerrilla wars and I think we must have a capability to fight those. And we may have to fight them somewhere based on legitimate threats, but we must learn, in this country, how to define those threats and that is what I would say to the question of world peace. I think it is bogus, totally artificial. There is no threat. The Communists are not about to take over our McDonald hamburger stands. 

Now look at what Powell says:

When a "fire" starts that might require committing armed forces, we need to evaluate the circumstances. Relevant questions include:

• Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood?

• Have all other nonviolent policy means failed?

• Will military force achieve the objective?

• At what cost?

• Have the gains and risks been analyzed?

• How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?

As an example of this logical process, we can examine the assertions of those who have asked why [first] President Bush did not order our forces on to Baghdad after we had driven the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. We must assume that the political objective of such an order would have been capturing Saddam Hussein. Even if Hussein had waited for us to enter Baghdad, and even if we had been able to capture him, what purpose would it have served?

And would serving that purpose have been worth the many more casualties that would have occurred? Would it have been worth the inevitable follow-up: major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad? Fortunately for America, reasonable people at the time thought not. They still do.

In 1968, reasonable people like Cronkite, Kennedy, and Kerry looked at what we were doing through a logical and objective process and understood that total warfare was never going to be an option, that the political objective was not clearly defined or understood, which - as they saw it, made the risk for continued effort unacceptable.

Because we could not effectively combine military force with diplomatic and economic policies, clear and unambiguous objectives would never be given to the armed forces.  There became no war for the military to win unless we wanted to opt for total annihilation, which to this day, is an option some, like General Brady and Kid Rock, would have no qualms in ordering.

Now lets look at what General Powell told Rachel Maddow, April 1, 2009:

Decide what you are trying to achieve politically and if it can't be achieved through political and diplomatic and economic means, and you have to use military force, then make sure you know exactly what you're using the military force for and then apply it in a decisive manner.

Now, the means he's [Obama] applying to it—21,000 more troops, hundreds more civilians, a billion and a half dollars a year to Pakistan—is that enough? Is that decisive? I don't know the answer to that question because even the greatest of all strategists must take into account the presence of an enemy.

In Vietnam it appears we had met the enemy, and that enemy was Ky and Loan.  So when Kerry said:

We are asking Americans to think about that because how do you ask a man to be the last man to die in Vietnam? How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?

It's that word 'mistake' that causes all the bitterness.  Did over 55 thousand Americans die for a mistake?  Surely we cannot think that fathomable, that our government did not do them right.  At some point opinion changed enough to bring the war to a close.  It took people going against the notion of my country right or wrong.  It took people questioning their duty to fight and die for a situation that did not make sense.

And the reason it started to not make sense was because bit by bit the picture of what was happening there became clearer.  You can manipulate the words and background all you want, but sometimes when you look at a cigar, what you see is just a cigar regardless of what your mind may want to compare it to.

So did our defeat in Vietnam come from, as General Brady states:

"the elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard."

Or did these folks see it for what it was. Were they cowardly, dishonest, misleading, liars, and bastards for speaking out?  Did they have an obligation - a right - to question the expenditure of blood and treasure?  Does the public ever have a right to tell its government involved in war, stop?

General Powell thinks so:

"I have infinite faith in the American people's ability to sense when and where we should draw the line."

Two US Generals, two very different opinions.  I think I'll listen to the more reasoned one.

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Does opposing the war, wound those who are not opposed to it?

These last few posts have centered on the question of a right to question why I am being demanded to perform a certain act.  And in asking, If I disagree with that reason, do I have a right to refuse without being called a "coward" or "bastard", or "horrible?"

To accept unequivocally what someone else views as right, when it is not right, nor just, makes me what?

That question is difficult to answer when the acceptance is fundamentally offering your blood for something.  I am pretty sure that most people would think it reasonable question why they were being asked to do something with that as its ultimate cost.  And as the cost rose the questions of why would become more and more relevant to making a decision.  So why is questioning one's duty in a war off-limits or taboo?

Heck I know the primary answer to that.  War takes bodies.  Lots and lots of bodies.  More bodies than will come from those who see the effort as something they actually want to do.  You can't go to war without troops and you can't have the troops you require if some question the purpose and refuse to participate.  So it has always been framed as; do your duty for your country.

Vietnam, however, exposed an ugly side of America and that duty.  That is, what we were doing there had more to do with other, less noble reasons, than what we had been told we were spending blood and treasure for.

When I asked the question:

Does my duty include shedding my blood so that Richard Nixon would not be the first president to lose a war, a relevant reason to do so?  

It gets even harder to answer when you ask the question:

Does my duty to shed my blood for my country's honor make it a relevant reason to do so?  

Still harder is to ask the question:

Is it my duty to do whatever it takes to provide honor and dignity to those who have fought and died before me in this effort?

That last one is what I have come to now understand may be the reason why some - I call them absolutists - are still bothered by those who dared to question our effort and specifically towards those who worked towards ending the war without a definitive "win."

Here, once again, is what General Brady said in his commentary that started me down this journey and these many blog posts:

The American soldier was never defeated on the battlefield in Vietnam; our defeat came from the elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard.

Now let's look at what the Swift Boat Vets have to say about John Kerry's 1971 speech to congress:

Sen. John Kerry's 2004 presidential bid became the catalyst for an unprecedented political movement by Vietnam veterans who had long resented his false 1971 testimony that American troops routinely committed war crimes.

During the Vietnam War, the original television networks and the leading liberal newspapers were near the peak of their formidable persuasive powers, able to dominate public opinion to an extent difficult to imagine today. In an age without cable news networks, conservative talk radio or the Internet, they were the only game in town. What these organizations chose to cover became news, and what they ignored did not. They used that power to instill Kerry's false portrait of American veterans as misfits, drug addicts and baby killers into the popular culture.

When John Kerry made his service in Vietnam the cornerstone of his presidential campaign during the 2004 election, the wounds he had inflicted on millions of Vietnam veterans were re-opened. Many could no longer be silent while a man who had repeated the propaganda of America's enemies rose to the position of Commander-in-Chief.

Now there was another ulterior motive to this, and that was to smear the guy some did not want for president.  But the criticism directed at him is nonetheless the same vitriol spewed out towards others who took the same tone.  And yes, I chose those words purposely because it pisses me off that some believe I have no right to question the cost in blood and treasure.

Here is what I take issue with:

In an age without cable news networks, conservative talk radio or the Internet, they were the only game in town. What these organizations chose to cover became news, and what they ignored did not.

What that statement postulates is this:  Had they controlled the message, public opinion would have been different and the outcome would have been different as well.  Okay...I'll buy that as a possibility.  Now let me ask four questions:

1. Had the news of Tet and General Loan's execution of Nguyen Van Lem been reported by conservative reporters, would there have been a different story reported?
2. Would the way conservative outlets have reported that news changed public opinion?
3. If all the reporting was "liberal" and that reporting had "formidable persuasive powers" would replacing it with a "conservative" methodology generate the same "formidable persuasive powers" "to dominate public opinion?"
4. Had the media and message been controlled and dominated by conservative media, and public opinion come to the same conclusion, would Walter Cronkite, Robert Kennedy, and John Kerry still be seen as pariahs by the right?

Basically, does manipulation of public opinion meet with approval if the end result is to my liking?  To assume that one side manipulated public opinion presenting a "false" impression also requires one to assume that the other side would manipulate public opinion by presenting what it deems as the truth.  That is, once again, had we shown the film of General Loan shooting Nguyen Van Lem and told the viewers, as Rollins contends:

Rollins: Television's Vietnam - The visual language of  Television News

What would have changed if we had been told the statement that was more than likely designed to convey a context more forgiving of the General? (see blog post).

"Many Americans have been killed these last few days and many of my best Vietnamese friends.  Now do you understand?  Buddha will understand."

 After all, we had been told what the General had said the day before in most major newspapers:

"They killed many Americans and many of our people."

How would that have changed the picture and made it "more complex?"  Well I think I may understand why folks like Rollins and Culbert think so.  Look at this statement from Rollins:

"No one noted at the time - and few noted later - that, at that very moment General Loan was shooting a single ununiformed soldier, North Vietnamese soldiers were systematically executing 2800 South Vietnamese civilian government and public school teachers outside the city of Hue."

Now look at Culbert's paper:

Culbert: Television's Visual Impact on Decision Making in the US, 1968

Now look at General Brady's San Antonio Express News article:

"And it was unlikely that the civilians would rise up for a party that massacred 3,000 innocent men, women, children and religious in Hue; some who were buried alive and clubbed to death to save ammunition. Who saw that in our media?"

Here is what I see.  Had the "conservative" side of the story been reported, that is, had we been told about the atrocities of the other side we would have concluded that they paled in comparison to what General Loan did.

If they killed 3000 citizens and we killed 2000, would that context change how we should view what we did?

Look at the context the New York Times did to try and blunt the force of the Eddie Adams photo:

NY Times Feb 2, 1968

Context was there.  It's just that people are a bit smarter than the absolutists, Culbert & Rollins, and the Swift Boat Vets against John Kerry think we are.  Look at how Culbert sees the Loan Execution affecting those that share a different view for our continued involvement in the war:

Culbert: Television's Visual Impact on Decision Making in the US, 1968

Really?  Is that what was shown to us?  Was what we saw manipulated so that it "purported to show the actual practice of justice?"  Was it "misleading" or did it show factually what it was - an actual execution, that in General Loan's view was not just necessary but demanded?

"I respect the Vietcong in uniform.  They are fighting men like me.  People know when they are wounded I take care of them.  I see they get to to the hospital.  But when they are not in uniform, they are criminals and the rule of war is death." (Harper's April  1972 article "Portrait of an Aging Despot" page 72)

Which begs the question: why were people: "looking for a reason to change their views on a matter of policy?"

Maybe the context was there all the time.  Maybe what was said, what we were told to believe, what we held as sacred and honorable, was not taking place.  Maybe all the "elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard" did was show us what we suspected, but hoped wasn't the case.

Which begs one more question: what would the "cable news networks, conservative talk radio or the Internet" have done differently?

Was the press "misleading" on the General Loan shooting?  Would the conservative press present it differently. or, recognizing its potential impact, suppress it?  Is the public better served seeing flag-draped coffins of soldiers killed in combat or should that be off limits?

Which brings me to the question posed in the title of this blog.  Did John Kerry inflict wounds on millions of vets because of what he said on April 22, 1971?  Culbert believes the General Loan footage and photograph were misleading.  General Brady contends that the media and and "professors from Berkeley to Harvard" were "dishonest."  The swift boat vets claim that what John Kerry said to Congress was a "false portrait of American veterans."

"Misleading", "dishonest", and "false".  Which taken together would seem to indicate that the truth has not been told.  I think I have presented enough information on what was actually said about General Loan and what the CIA and Jonson knew about the situation in Vietnam.  What I have not addressed is Swift Boat Vets for Truth's contention that John Kerry was a big fat liar on April 22, 1971.

Next post: What did John Kerry say on April 22, 1971 that was false?

My Country Right or Wrong

Antipathetic: Opposed in nature or character; antagonistic.

I have been struggling to understand how I should feel about the Vietnam war.  As you can see by the number of posts on the topic of Eddie Adams, General Loan, and Tet,  I find this topic interesting.  But there is something else driving it, and it's only been in this last week that I am coming to terms with it.

I have been reading Michael Sandel's book: Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do? and was fascinated by his chapter on John Rawl's "veil of ignorance" theory on how to come up with a fair and impartial point of view.

The veil of ignorance”: to insure impartiality of judgment, the parties are deprived of all knowledge of their personal characteristics and social and historical circumstances. (1)

To be objective, which is what I strive for, I need to put aside the fact that it could have been me over there.  The fact that it wasn't does not remove that fact.  And with that fact, I know that how I feel about the war is not objective, even if my conclusion is valid.

I have gone back in time.  I am back at my childhood home, eating dinner with my family.  I am driving from Garden Grove California to Carpinteria Beach near Santa Barbara with my family.  I am young - but old enough to understand.

I don't recall ever getting into a discussion with my folks regarding the war.  We must have talked about it, we talked a lot during dinners.  My folks, especially my father, share very black and white views of the world.  I remember their disgust for hippies, and one of our relatives who dodged the draft, if I recall.  I don't recall anything else except my dad stating a number of times that the reason you do your duty is because your country asked you to.  Your country right or wrong he would say.

Now that I am older, I understand a bit better why my dad and others feel that this premise is the guiding reason you do your duty.  It's not your place to question when called on.  He did it in Korea, his father did it in World War I, my mom's uncles did it.  And if the time came for me in Vietnam, the expectation would be that I would do my duty too.

My dad never saw combat, something he regrets, especially when he is with his friends who were called over before the Korean war ended.  Maybe had he seen combat he would have had a different opinion.  Most likely not.  My great uncle Joe lost an arm in D-day.  He never spoke about the war and forbid my aunt, who came form Nazi occupied Germany, to speak about the war as well.  I am sure if I had talked to him about Vietnam he might have told me something. Most likely not.

Had the war not ended in 1973 and continued on, when I turned 18, I would have been of draft age.  And that's the angst I feel right now when I ask my 54 year old self, what would you do now, without your 18 year old veil of ignorance on? (yes, I know that's not what that term means).  Hindsight is 20/20.  So let me put a figurative veil of ignorance back on and try to look at it objectively.

The problem with the premise of "my country right or wrong" is that it assumes that the "wrong" is an honest mistake or miscalculation.  It does not assume manipulation by people to further their own gains and egos.

I am faced with this knowledge of what it was, as I struggle to form my opinion:  Should my duty to my country be based on a real need or the need expressed by those who hold power and sway over me?  Did Richard Nixon prolong the war because he did not want to be "the first President to lose a war?" (2)  Was the desire for "peace with honor" a reason to continue throwing more blood and treasure at it till that objective was achieved? (3)

Did I owe it to Nixon, or any other president, to shed my blood?  Was our honor worth giving up my life?  Was this what my dad wanted for me?  No, I don't think so.  What he, and so many others wanted, was for me to concentrate on the duty part.  The reason you went was irrelevant when your country called you.  That's what young men did.  My country, right or wrong!

But that's a romantic notion of war and duty.  It assumes nobility, purpose, rationality.  Vietnam, as we know now, and started to figure out as it became more and more a cluster, was not a traditional war.  And this is where the dynamics in play become antipathetic.

• If I am to perform my duty for my country, shouldn't my effort be for a worthy and rational cause?
• And if it turns out that the premise for the cause was miscalculated, should that miscalculation be rectified?
• And if rectifying it, we choose to end it, does that make the effort up to that point a waste?
• Does my country's need for honor require of me the same effort as for her defense?

Where it became antipathetic was the requirement to rectify it was pitted against the honor of those who had fought, died, and suffered.  Should it be called a mistake, as John Kerry did: in 1971?

Each day to facilitate the process by which the United States washes her hands of Vietnam someone has to give up his life so that the United States doen'st have to admit something that the entire world already knows, so that we can't say they we have made a mistake. Someone has to die so that President Nixon won't be, and these are his words, "the first President to lose a war."

We are asking Americans to think about that because how do you ask a man to be the last man to die in Vietnam? How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake? But we are trying to do that, and we are doing it with thousands of rationalizations... (4)

It can only become antipathetic because guys like General Brady honestly and truly need to believe::

The American soldier was never defeated on the battlefield in Vietnam; our defeat came from the elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard. (5)

General Brady has no choice but to voice his displeasure of having his honor taken from him.  Honor that is important to him and others.  Honor worth dying for.  Honor worth perusing, regardless the cost.  To call the war a mistake, makes the nullifies the effort.  There is no honor in a lost cause, in a mistake.  "We were never defeated" General Brady states, but those bastards that looked behind the curtain took from him something he was willing to die for: his country right, or wrong.  Duty...honor.

And now it becomes personal once again.  Do I have a duty to my country to give my life for something that is no longer rational?  Do I have a duty to others who have fulfilled their duty, regardless of that rational?  Do I have a duty to uphold the honor of those who did fight?  Do I have a duty to them?

And if I do have a duty, is that duty sacrosanct?  Do I have a say in how much effort should be put in for that honor?  Does honor and duty trump the reality in play?  What if the needs of those who hold power and sway or nothing more than a want?  What if it is ego, pride, profit, or promotion dictating what my country wants from me?

Can I question it?  Can I disagree without being called cowardly, horrible, or bastards?  Can I admit it was a mistake without taking honor from those who fought and those who need purpose attached to their effort?

I think I can.  I think it can be done without it being antipathetic with the views of General Brady.  For this to be done, however, requires us to lose the romantic notion of war, and to see duty as just that; duty.  I am called and I answer.  And if it turns out you mislead me, manipulated me, or made a terrible miscalculation, my duty is no less noble than anyone else s effort.  And that duty goes above and beyond the battle field.  We have a duty to point out the mistakes of this country when it has the power to call on its sons and daughters to give up their life for it.

My country right or wrong?  No...I don't think it's that simplistic.

There but for the grace of God go I....

Come on mothers throughout the land,

Pack your boys off to Vietnam.

Come on fathers, and don't hesitate

To send your sons off before it's too late.

And you can be the first ones in your block

To have your boy come home in a box. 

Country Joe And The Fish, wrote that and made the Vietnam Song famous during Woodstock.  Gimme and "F"...Gimme a "U"...

I thought about that song when I started writing these posts on if our effort was worth the cost.  Was the condemnation of  Kitt, Cronkite, Kennedy, King, the hippies justified?  Were they the one's who "lost" the war for us, or, like I believe now, the war was never ours to win since South Vietnam had nothing to offer its people other than being not-communists, which for a peasant, means very little.

I want to go back to Carl von Clausewitz understanding of war:

[T]he use of power involves two factors. The first is the strength of available means, which may be measured somewhat by numbers (although not entirely). The second factor is the strength of the will which can not be specifically measured (only estimated) as it is intangible.  Once a state has gained an approximation of the enemy's strength of resistance it can review its own means and adjust them upwards accordingly in an effort to gain the advantage. As the enemy will also be doing this, it too becomes reciprocal. [third reciprocal action] (1)

We had the strength, no doubt about that.  But in Vietnam, it really did not matter how strong our military was, without the other factor needed to meet our objectives - a stable south Vietnam government - all our military could do is keep the bad guys at bay, which Tet showed in 1968, was not going to be easy.

Now that we knew, and by "we" I mean the people of the US, Carl von Clausewitz's second factor kicks in:

The second factor is the strength of the will which can not be specifically measured (only estimated) as it is intangible.  Once a state has gained an approximation of the enemy's strength of resistance it can review its own means and adjust them upwards accordingly in an effort to gain the advantage.

Walter Cronkite and Robert Kennedy saw what it was going to take, and understood how difficult, or most likely saw it as impossible, for the United States to "win" this conflict.  Which is why Robert Kennedy said in his February 1968 speech:

For years we have been told that the measure of our success and progress in Vietnam was
increasing security and control for the population. Now we have seen that none of the population
is secure and no area is under sure control.

Four years ago when we only had about 30,000 troops in Vietnam, the Vietcong were unable to mount the assaults on cities they have now conducted against our enormous forces. At one time a suggestion that we protect enclaves was derided. Now there are no protected enclaves. 

This has not happened because our men are not brave or effective, because they are. It is because we have misconceived the nature of the war: It is because we have sought to resolve by military might a conflict whose issue depends upon the will and conviction of the South Vietnamese people. It is like sending a lion to halt an epidemic of jungle rot. (2)

I think that was a reasonable and fair analogy.  It is also an accurate understanding of what was happening in Vietnam.  So if we can't "win" with our military alone, how much "means" should we put into it as we "adjust upwards accordingly?"

This is where it hits close to home for me.  I could have been the "means" had we continued.  Without fully understanding my reasoning for taking exception to General Patrick Brady's San Antonio Express News article, I understood when I read it that he was incorrect in his premise:

[O]ur defeat came from the elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard.

General Brady is an absolutist (in addition to being delusional).  Had we pressed on; "Unbelievably, there was no military follow-up." would that have changed anything?  I can't say, but neither can he.  But the fact still remains that we could not achieve our objectives with the military alone.  Unless you don't want to believe the CIA's analysis in May, 1968:

"The situation thereafter will largely depend, as it has in the past, on the question of the will to persist of either side rather than on the attainment of an overwhelming military victory."

General Brady, as an absolutist, thinks the lion can cure jungle rot.  Walter Cronkite and Robert Kennedy, as realists, understand that the lion cannot.

General Brady is one of "those who said that we could win and must" and Cronkite, Kennedy, Kitt, and "the elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard (3)" are "those who said that even if we could win we should not and that the military considerations were a complete obfuscation of the basic issues." (4 page 2)

General Brady is free to express his reasons as to why he thinks we could win and should have continued on, something he has not done other than denigrate those who share the other view and make up stories in an effort to right a wrong that is there but not there to the degree he thinks it is.  How he feels about what took place is uniquely his own, and. like for me, his objectivity can be compromised by factors that fall close to home.

Without a crystal ball there is no way to determine what course taken - or not taken - would have resulted in a better outcome.  What we do know for sure is that the enemy had the capability of making us work for that victory.  That's where Carl von Clausewitz's "it can review its own means and adjust them upwards accordingly in an effort to gain the advantage" comes in.  Evaluate and re-evaluate.  Left to General Brady, Kid Rock, Hawks, and absolutists, the means is "whatever it takes."

In 1968 I was 11 years old.  When I was 12, Country Joe was telling me what could await me.  When I was 16, Richard Nixon finally put an end to "whatever it takes."

There but for the grace of God go I.


Next Post: My Country Right or Wrong

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Why General Loan is not a "good guy"

Okay, so maybe I should have titled this: "Why General Loan should not be described as a "good guy""

Who am I to decide who is good and bad?  I mean that's been the point of these posts, hasn't it?  How should we look at someone, how should we classify an act, what factors are important in making a decision on how we should feel about something?

What started me down the Eddie Adams path was a completely baseless assertion from a General Brady and my response to it.  In the process of researching the Tet Offensive, I came across the Eddie Adams photograph and a whole bunch of "facts" regarding what took place and how the photo helped/hurt the Vietnam war effort.

If you read my blog (Woot! I have three readers now!) you will notice I have a problem with half-truths, lies, propaganda, and ignorance.  Opinion is one thing, misstating something because you failed to fully research it is another.  I hold a lot of contempt for people who should know (General Brady) and use their power/title (the "General") to further an ideology or perpetuate a false history using innuendo, bogus information, and outright lies.  Tet can be looked at objectively for what it was, it does not need to be rewritten using a made-up event and conversation with General Vo Nguyan Giap, the supreme communist commander during Tet.

The same goes for the Eddie Adams photo, Adams himself, General Loan, and Nguyen Van Lem.  The truth is the truth, regardless of where it leads or what it tells you about us, them, or humanity in general.

We have on record that Eddie Adams called General Loan a "good guy."  Now he may have been figuratively speaking, as in - good guy because he was on our side, but that's not what I hear when I listen to him say "good guy."

In my last post, I discussed what makes some one good or bad, and how which side of the fence you are on helps form your response.  I contend that it should not matter.  Bad is bad and good is good.  Which brings us back to General Loan and Adams' assertion that he was a good guy.

Hopefully I have been able to support why I believe Eddie Adams used that term to describe the man.  I don't think Adams was naive, I do think he was mislead by both General Loan and those that needed the incident to be downplayed.  That, and his guilt over the harm the photo caused General Loan (see post) lead to the designation of "good guy" he used.

So, looking at it objectively, was General Loan a "good guy?"

I contend that he was not.  I base this on a lot of background information, CIA reports, and observations from other journalists.  I'll show you what I mean, but first I want to print the one account that sealed it for me, an incident that takes General Loan from a "good guy" to not a very nice human being.

From Tom Buckley's: "Portrait of an Aging Despot", Harper's, April 1972 Page 72:

This was after the Tet incident in 1968.  Does that sound like someone worthy of the title "good guy?"

Oh, but wait...there is more.


Next Post: And it's one, two, three WHO are we fighting for?

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There is war, and there is everything else

I am starting to get a clearer picture of the dynamics in play regarding how military folks, like General Brady, see the world after combat.  So here is my thesis:

There is war, and there is everything else.

General Brady is a man of war, he is also a man of everything else.  I am a man of only everything else.  I have developed this thesis in two days from looking at a whole slew of information regarding Tet, General Giap, and the events surrounding Eddie Adam's picture.  Two days does not a historian make, which is why I call this a thesis.

It was not until I read Eddie Adam's Eulogy for General Loan in Time, that a clearer picture of what transpires during war came into focus.  What he says makes sense in terms of a reality - war.  Then, after watching Fox New's  War Stories With Oliver North on Tet, General Brady's concluding statement and the 'why' behind his need to manipulate history, became apparent.

The Vietnam soldier was not afforded the same degree of worth for their effort as other soldier's who fought in wars that we 'won'.  We did not 'win' the war in Vietnam, not because of the effort on the part of the soldier, but because the war was deemed to no longer be worth the price being paid.  Now think about this from a soldier's perspective.  I did this...I participated in this...I worked as hard as any other soldier throughout history. I sacrificed my humanity...my buddies...my youth...my morality for something that is now deemed unworthy of that continued sacrifice.

Ending the Vietnam war before we had vanquished our enemy made everything that makes a soldier a soldier, moot.  And this is why my thesis: there is war and there is everything else, seems to make sense to me.  Without the 'win' it seems pointless to have done all that, a that that only manifests itself in a war.

So we the American people, took away their win as some see it.  Not only that, we incorrectly discounted their effort as a way to distance ourselves from what we had allowed our government to require them to perform.  This is the dynamic in play.  Those who create the war, create the warrior.  Take away the war, and you still have the warrior.  But now that warrior has seen and done things that are no longer acceptable outside of that war.  They must live with that, so when General Brady concludes:

A dishonest media opened a gash in the psyche of that veteran and rubbed salt in it. It is time for the great warriors of Tet 1968 take their place in the hierarchy of American heroes.

He is speaking about a reality that he understands is present.  Unfortunately, he is blaming others for imposing their reality on his need for a check mark in the win column.  His participation in the war and the psyche of the warrior is one reality.  The reality posed by Walter Cronkite, is another equally relevant one as well:

To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.

Cronkite's reality is equally valid and is also in play with the one General Brady understands to be valid as well.  However, only one premise can be true at any one time.  This is a strange paradigm.

Lets look at this from an American point of view.  Do we, as Americans, hold our Constitution to be the foundation for how our society should live, its basic tenants?  Do we, as Americans, who are primarily Christian and Jewish, hold our Bible as the foundation for our morality?  If you answer "yes" then you will also need to answer the next two questions:

1. Does the US Constitution state that no person shale "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law?"
2. Does the Bible state "thou shall not kill?"

Now let's not go into exceptions and what not.  Heck, even the 5th amendment gives an 'out' stating "except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger."  My point is...that we hold these two premises to be sacrosanct, do we not?  If they are not important tenants, than why put them there?  Why would God give it as one of his ten commandments if it was not something he felt, you know, important to uphold?

So if they are that important at that high of a level, how do we rectify those two sacrosanct premises with this statement:

"As we were walking...we see the South Vietnamese police pull this guy out the door that they just grabbed from the second story he was snipping.  And we start following him and walking up the street.  We get near the corner and out of, to my left, I see this guy walk in.  Soon as he got close to him, I see him go for his pistol.  And as he raises the pistol, I raised my camera and took the picture."

I wrote that down while watching Fox New's War Stories With Oliver North.  That was what Eddie Adams, the photographer, had to say about taking that picture.  And this is how Eddie Adams saw the situation after he got back to his post.  Again, in his own words:

"I thought nothing of it, it's somebody shooting somebody.  It's war.  It happens everyday."

There is context needed here, but really, there is no context that can ever rectify the two premises we hold sacrosanct with what fate had allowed to transpire that day.  We are forced by these tenants to choose one category for each participant - good guy or bad guy, hero or villain.

When in a war, the soldier in that place - at that time - cannot choose one or the other.  They effectively have no choice but to accept the reality as it is and rectify it at a later date.  Eddie Adams was a soldier and a photographer, which is why he could accept this as just a normal part of what was taking place around him.

But accepting it does not rectify it with what we know to be sacrosanct.  Under normal circumstances, Loan - the man in the picture shooting the other man - would have never done that.  And, under normal circumstances, Eddie Adams, had he witnessed the same situation on a street in America, would have never said "I thought nothing of it, it's somebody shooting somebody."

We have placed these guys we call soldiers in a situation whereby they are forced to accept what is not acceptable as acceptable.  And to do this, they make statements that allow them to acknowledge their tacit acceptance without having to grapple with the only conclusion that can be made about it; that it was wrong based on the tenants they hold as sacrosanct.

"He killed many of my men and many of your people." Loan said

Does that fact even matter?  Or does it serve only to allow a behavior known to those who witnessed it as being wrong to be overlooked...ignored?  This is the paradox these guys fall into.  It must be classified as wrong or the two sacrosanct premises - depriving someone of life - killing - are irrelevant.  And if they are trivial, then the Constitution and Bible are not valid documents of authority. And if it is wrong, then how can they continue to witness and participate in it without attempting to stop it?  As I see it, the only way to rectify this is to basically form two parallel worlds.

The "other" Spock

There is war, and there is everything else.

It is not very difficult to accept that if someone is trying to kill you, you can defend yourself and kill them.  The sniper can and should be neutralized.  That's fair, that's reasonable, that's acceptable (unless you are a pacifist).  But Loan did not neutralize the sniper, he punished him.  And in that situation, like similar situations unique only to war, it can not be right and also be wrong.  It must be one or the other.  And yet in war it can never be one or the other, or those participating will then need to be categorized as either good or bad.  General Brady wants to categorize the Vietnam vet as hero.  This I contend, only perpetuates the paradox.

So when Eddie Adams says about Loan:

He was a good guy.  He was fighting for America with Americans.  I think he was a goddamn hero.

I understand why Adams needs to say it like that.  I also understand why General Brady desperately needs General Giap to declare Tet "the communist calamity it was."  I also understand how critical the press, public, and professors are in keeping the pressure on their government to not be so caviler about placing some of their citizens in a situation where they will be seen both as a good guy and a bad guy by their fellow countrymen.  Even Adams is aware of the odd dynamic in play because of war:

"America condemned him [Loan].  They said he had shot someone in cold blood.  Two lives were destroyed in that photograph.  The person who was shot and the person who pulled the trigger."

There is war and there is everything else.  And that seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.



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Stop the Press! (unless you are spinning it my way)

So one thing always begets another.  Which if you like eclectic stuff, is fun to dive into.  My last post was about General Patrick Brady's assertion that he was going to film a documentary whereby Gen. Vo Nguyan Giap, supreme communist commander during the Vietnam war "agreed to declare Tet the communist calamity it was."

Now that did not sound anything near what a General would ever say, so I went looking and found nothing to support that declaration except an urban myth exuding the same thing.  But a two star General, Vietnam vet, medal of valor winner was stating this as true!  And then I thought, you mean the same one who, just a couple of days ago, had been called out in the San Antonio Express News for giving "demonstrably false information to the public?"  Yeah, that same one.  What to think...what to think.

So in the process of trying to figure out what to accept as a truth, I come across a lot of really poor information.  But in and amongst the dung are some diamonds.

Now one site I stumbled upon takes the position that the Vietnam war was lost due to antiwar sentiment brought about, provided, and perpetuated by the news media.  This is a common explanation of why were not outrightly victorious in Vietnam used by those who consider themselves hawks or believe in the United State as a military superpower and hegemon.

And within this explanation - the press lost it for us - one must ask, is that so?  Had we been kept in the dark, would the war have proceeded differently?  Yes.  Would we have been victorious in all our effort?  Maybe.  Could it have been much worse for us had we not known what was going on?  Maybe as well.

So my question is this: Does our government have the right to keep from us all information that might sway our opinion on a topic that directly affects us?  Looking at it another way, does an 18 year old male have a right to know what is happening in a foreign land where he will be sent and possibly killed?  Do the parents and wives and children need to be told the good, bad, and ugly so that they can decide if it is worth their blood and treasure that someone else has decided they are willing to expend?

So when Steven F. Hayward, the F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and an adjunct fellow of the Ashbrook Center, writes:

The Cronkite broadcast opened the floodgates for the media to offer their judgments, as opposed to their reporting, about the war.

 I am left to ponder, what good is reporting something if the context is left out?  Or how it is interconnected with something else is not described?  How am I to draw a conclusion on just looking at a raw fact?

For example, lets say I live near a large vacant lot and the newspaper reports that a new business is being built on that lot and it will employee 100 people.  As the building is going up the newspaper reports the number of walls, the number of nails, the cubic yards of concrete poured, but it never tells me the purpose of the building until it is built.  And because I am downwind from it, I get to endure the smell of fish, that had I been told at the very beginning was the purpose of the building, I may have been able to stop it from being built.

In a round about way, that is what is being offered as acceptable, especially in times of war.  If you just let us do what it takes to win, we will win.  Lets look at another example of how Hayward sees the dangers posed by guys like Walter Cronkite sticking their two-cents in.  Here is what Hayward says in his piece:

On the morning of January 31, the first full day of the Tet attack, Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams and a Vietnamese TV cameraman employed by NBC were wandering around Saigon getting photos and footage of the battle damage when they noticed a small contingent of South Vietnamese troops with a captive dressed in a checked shirt. From the other direction came Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan, chief of South Vietnam’s national police. As Adams and the NBC cameraman aimed their cameras, Loan calmly raised his sidearm and shot the prisoner—a Viet Cong officer—in the head.

Now without any context other than the facts presented in the above description and the fact you can visually see in the photo, should comment be offered, or should only the photo be displayed with just the facts?  Some folks would argue that the photo should never have been shown, that war is ugly and that's just what happens.

Hayward writes:

Most news accounts of the photo ignored this context; the drama of the picture was just too irresistible for most news organizations to try to put it in any kind of balanced context.

In other words, had you known the context - the connectivness to something else - the judgement as to the what and why he was being shot - you would look at this picture differently.  Hayward offers:

Loan walked over to Adams and said in English: "They killed many Americans and many of my men." (It was not reported at the time that the prisoner had also taunted his captors, saying "Now you must treat me as a prisoner of war," and had been identified as the assassin of a South Vietnamese army officer’s entire family.)

So when does offering context cross the line into judgement?  My answer is when you don't like what the judgment is.  The fact that Hayward may find the assassination of a prisoner in handcuffs acceptable based on his value system, others (including myself) may not.  And in a democracy, if more of us disagree with one model we have the right to say change it.

You can blame Cronkite for loosing the Vietnam war, but all he did was point out the context that we were being manipulated by our government and General Westmoreland into thinking all was good, the end was nigh!  Tet may have been mis-characterized as a communist victory by the media, but it was correctly analyzed - in my opinion - by Walter Cronkite on February 27, 1968: (see note)

We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. They may be right, that Hanoi's winter-spring offensive has been forced by the Communist realization that they could not win the longer war of attrition, and that the Communists hope that any success in the offensive will improve their position for eventual negotiations. It would improve their position, and it would also require our realization, that we should have had all along, that any negotiations must be that -- negotiations, not the dictation of peace terms. For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate.

What did Cronkite base this on?  Context.  Look at what Westmoreland said to the National Press Club on November 21, 1967:

[t]he communists were "unable to mount a major offensive...I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view."

Two months later, Tet.  Now the argument is made by some, such as General Brady, that with reference to what happened after Tet:

Unbelievably, there was no military follow-up. Gen. Vo Nguyan Giap, supreme communist commander, would marvel at the mess we made of our victory. His force was devastated. Yet our dishonest media had presented Tet to the American politicians and people as a great communist victory and many people still believe that.

Brady's contention is, that because we were victorious at Tet and had we pushed, we would have won the war decisively and no peace talks or withdraw in 1972 would have tarnished our military reputation and the men & woman who participated.  Maybe.  Or maybe we would still be there like in Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting an enemy we do not respect for their resolve.  The fact of the matter is, we do not know what turn the war would have taken had the American people been kept in the dark and men like General Brady given carte blanch to just "get er' done,"





Note: Walter Cronkite also said in that same piece: "[t]he use of nuclear weapons, or the mere commitment of one hundred, or two hundred, or three hundred thousand more American troops to the battle. And with each escalation, the world comes closer to the brink of cosmic disaster." Nukes and cosmic disaster did not manifest itself.

And you were there! (only we forgot to film it)

I am perplexed.  I am also flabbergasted.  I like these two words because you would never use them in speaking, but in writing, they really work well.

I was in San Antonio this week and was reading their newspaper, the San Antonio Express News.  I make it a habit to read the Opinion Page, especially the Letters to the Editor.

So I read a rebuttal to a January 20th commentary written for the paper by some guy named Patrick Brady.  The letter starts:

There is a line responsible journalists draw between giving columnists leeway to express opinion and allowing them to give demonstrably false information to the public.

It then goes on to show why various "facts" described by Patrick Brady regarding President Obama are untrue.  So this, unbeknown to me at that time, sets in motion this blog and my perplexedness and flabbergastedness experienced this morning as I dug further into it.

On Friday I am reading the San Antonio Express News and there is a column called: "Despite reports of the day, Tet battle was American victory" written by Patrick Brady, who is identified as a "Retired Army Maj. Gen. [who] earned the Medal of Honor in Vietnam."

Now there are certain words that conservative types use when they write.  They, at least to me, standout like little beacons warning me to be wary of an ideological bias.  So when I read:

The American soldier was never defeated on the battlefield in Vietnam; our defeat came from the elite in the courtrooms, the classroom, the cloakrooms and the newsrooms, from cowardly media-phobic politicians and irresponsible, dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard.

I pretty much knew what message he was wanting to convey and the demon(s) he was to hold responsible.  In that one single sentence, General Brady laid down the reason as; everyone lied to us about what really happened in Vietnam.  Even Walter Cronkite's name was invoked as a member of the "dishonest media"!

Now I don't know enough about Tet to argue whether General Brady's description of the event in Vietnam 43 years ago accurately reflects the truth.  What I do know is that he had been called out for giving "demonstrably false information to the public" just a few days earlier, and his bashing of the media and professors put him squarely into the neo-con corner of journalistic types.

So I go on line looking for what happened at Tet, first looking at Wikipedia's version.  I was particularly interested in General Brady's comment that:

Years later, to help correct the lies about Tet, Gen. William Westmoreland asked me to go to Vietnam and meet with [Gen. Vo Nguyan Giap, supreme communist commander] Giap to arrange a documentary wherein Giap agreed to declare Tet the communist calamity it was.

There was something about that statement that just did not sound right. What kind of General, especially one that was victorious over his enemy, would ever declare that something he was responsible for was a "calamity"?

That just did not sit right with me. But it was coming from a General himself, a two-star no less, and a decorated Vietnam War hero!  Who is this non-military participating guy that did not endure Vietnam (or any combat for that matter) to doubt such a man?  It was that last line that followed it that got me doubting its truthiness:

"I met with Giap, but we never got the film done."

Like I said, I don't have enough knowledge on Tet to say if the General's contention that General Giap did indeed think the battle was "a calamity" or "would marvel at the mess we made of our victory."  So I went a Googling, because if the media and professors are all liars, they do not have domain over the internet.  Surely I would find others that support General Brad'ys contention that Tet was an American Victory, a calamity for General Giap, and "Walter Cronkite and his ilk had saved Ho Chi Minh."

I found this statement, attributed to General Giap, made in 1982:

This is to tell you that in this, as in other things, the imperialists underestimate the strength of a people, of an army fighting for independence and freedom, for their rights to life.  It seems to me that even today the Pentagon and Washington and the White House are far from having learned the necessary lessons. In the classroom of History the imperialists are really poor students. 

I read the whole damn transcript of that 1982 interview, I can pretty much tell you that there is no damn way a man such as General Giap would have ever "agreed to declare Tet the communist calamity it was."

And a few Google search links later, there it is...on an urban legend website, "General Giap on How U.S. Lost the Vietnam War." which discusses an email that has been passed around now for a while:

The quote surfaced most recently in an anonymous forwarded email (example above) composed in December 2007, days after being mentioned on Rush Limbaugh's website, which in turn cited an October 3, 2007 NewsMax.com column by Geoff Metcalf as the source. According to Metcalf, the passage came from "[Giap's] memoirs currently found in the Vietnam War memorial in Hanoi."

Going to the NewsMax article link, you read " The following quote is from his memoirs currently found in the Vietnam War memorial in Hanoi::"

What we still don't understand is why you Americans stopped the bombing of Hanoi. You had us on the ropes. If you had pressed us a little harder, just for another day or two, we were ready to surrender! It was the same at the battles of TET. You defeated us! We knew it, and we thought you knew it.

Only problem is, that there is no such memoir, that is, General Gaip never said that.

Now I want you to go back and read the transcript of the 1982 interview with General Giap and compare his wording, tenor, and explanations with the one attributed to him above.  Then go and read the NewsMax column and compare it to General Brady's San Antonio Express News column.  I'll wait.......

Do you see some similarities between the two?  Tet was, is, and always will be, just what Walter Cronkite said it was on February 27, of 1968:

To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To suggest we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.

So if General Brady finds this analysis of the events that happened 43 years ago, unsatisfactory to the conclusion he would like to have in its place, that's his right as a free American to do so.  What he does not have a right to do, in terms of integrity and honor, is to mislead people into believing a history that is not borne out by facts.  

To claim it is true by stating he was there ("Years later, to help correct the lies about Tet, Gen. William Westmoreland asked me to go to Vietnam and meet with Giap to arrange a documentary wherein Giap agreed to declare Tet the communist calamity it was.) and then boldly telling us that "we never got the film done"  - but - we should believe him over the "dishonest media and professors from Berkeley to Harvard"  even though there is no other evidence out there to support General Giap's declaration of Tet as "the communist calamity it was," - and - it smacks as the same type of story telling found in that urban myth. Well I am just left perplexed and flabbergasted!

[note 1/30/11 - After sleeping on it, my previous conclusion was a bit harsh and not as objective as it should be, so it has been changed.  Also corrected to "Medal of Honor"]

Patrick Brady is free to spin the take-away message of Tet in any way, shape, or form, he wants.  But because of his standing as not just a two star General, but as a Medal of Honor winner and Vietnam vet, what he says about it will carry a lot of weight.  However, what he states in his column contradicts the historical record (in reference to Giap's comments).  And because of his standing, and the fact that he also invokes General Westmoreland's standing to put words in another man's mouth, his assertion is bolstered to an even higher degree of credibility.  But with history, as in a court of law, this is still just heresay.

So I contend, that based on what I know about Tet, what I know about General Brady's leanings, and what I have been able to uncover, the burden to prove the historical record is false is in General Brady's court.  He owes history, as well as General Westmoreland and General Giap more than just his word to prove his assertion.  Show us the directive from General Westmoreland that discusses the documentary.  Show us travel orders indicating General Brady met with General Giap.  Heck, I would even be a bit swayed if I saw a picture of the two men in the same room together. Excuse me if I remain skeptical until then.

Note 1/30/2011 - See Snopes article for more information on this urban myth regarding General Giap.

And I also found this from the Oakland Museum of California - a May 1996, CNN interview that has been translated from Vietnamese:

The Tet Offensive is a long story. ... It was our policy, drawn up by Ho ChiMinh, to make the Americans quit. Not to exterminate all Americans in Vietnam, [but] to defeat them.  It could be said [Tet] was a surprise attack which brought us a big victory. For a big  battle we always figured out the objectives, the targets, so it was the main objective to  destroy the forces and to obstruct the Americans from making war. But what was more  important was to de-escalate the war -- because at that time the Americans were escalating the war -- and to start negotiations. So that was the key goal of that campaign.  But of course, if we had gained more than that it would be better.  And [after Tet] the Americans had to back down and come to the negotiating table, because the war was not only moving into the cities, to dozens of cities and towns in South Vietnam, but also to the living rooms of Americans back home for some time. And that’s why we could claim the achievement of the objective.

Does that sound like a man giddy to declare Tet the "calamity it really was?"

Notes: 1/31/11 - A pretty good (recent) story on Tet: War Stories With Oliver North: Tet Offensive Full Episode.

Now if you watch it you will see two things leaning in the direction that General Brady would find acceptable.  Oliver North and Fox News.  And yet it offers a pretty even-handed analysis, description, judgement, and comments about Tet - with an interview with Eddie Adams thrown in as well.  And it too declares the Tet offensive a communist failure in military terms, but it explains why it should be seen that way.  It does not, however, put words in General Giap's mouth as a means to prove that contention.  North 1, Brady 0


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